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Haden: Constitutional Law--Discrimination in Assessment for Taxation as

WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY

where the court said, "Nor have we any doubt that it (the governor's veto) must be filed within the prescribed time. If not
within five days, then within how many? Who shall say? Is not
a time limit, beyond which the citizen must know the fate of an
If there must be certainty in the statact passed, important?''
ute law, is there not a like need for certainty in the superior law
of the constitution?
If there are not adequate means by which the constitution
can be amended then there is need for a new constitutional convention; but there is no excuse for the court to remake the law
to reach a popular result. Decisions such as Herold v. Townsend,u make even the amendatory phase of constitutional law in
West Virginia no more than an unpredictable guess. Even the
conservative, after such a decision, would agree with Jerome
Frank that "What the courts in fact do is to manipulate the
language of former decisions. ' ' If judicial humility is more
than a misleading myth it is time that courts fearlessly apply the
law as it is and not as they wish it."
-TRixy M. PETERS.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW -

DISCRIMINATION IN

ASSESSMENT

TAxATION AS DENIAL OF EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS. -

FOR

An

electric power plant was assessed at one hundred per cent of its
actual value while all other properties in the county in the same
An
class were assessed at only eighty per cent of their value.
appeal was taken from an order affirming the assessment of the
Board of Equalization, and the Supreme Court of Appeals, two
judges dissenting, held the assessment a denial of equal protection
of the law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, by reason of which the power company was entitled to
have its property assessed on the same basis as other properties
in the same class. West Penn Power Co. v. Board of Review and
Equalization of Brooke County.1
There is nothing unique about this proposition of law. It
merely brings the West Virginia court in line with a long list
I'Supra n. 15, at 592.
1
7Supra n. 1.
1

8LAw AND THE MODERN M= (1931) 148.
10"One swallow alone doesn't make the summer".

Nor do seven scattered

cases make the law.
1 164 S. E. 862 (W. Va., 1932).
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of state' and United States Supreme Court8 cases. It is interesting to notice, however, that the decision is rested solely on the
Federal Constitution without reference to the equality and uniformity clause of the state constitution. Similar provisions of
other state constitutions have been construed to require uniformity in assessment,' and in that regard it is immaterial that
property is classified for tax purposes.'
In order to give the plaintiff equal protection the court must
either raise the assessments on all properties to one hundred per
cent, or reduce the plaintiff's assessment to eighty per cent. Under
the mandatory language of the West Virginia statute the first
alternative is required.' But it has been repeatedly held that a
court can only consider the valuation appealed from and cannot
revise or equalize the tax roll generally.' Therefore unless the
remedy given in the principal case is allowed, the plaintiff would
have no remedy at all. This case can be distinguished from the
case where mandamus is allowed a creditor against the assessor
requiring him to raise all the assessments in the county even
though by doing so uniformity with assessments in other counties
would be destroyed, since a county can be required to exhaust
its maximum revenue powers to provide funds to satisfy creditors,
a form of substitute for execution.8
2
Camp Phosphate Co. v. Allen, 77 Fla. 341, 81 So. 503 (1919); Peoples'
Gas Light & Coke Co. v. Stuckart, 268 Ill.
164, 121 N. E. 629 (1918); Newport Mining Co. v. Ironwood, 185 Mich. 668, 152 N. W. 1088 (1915) ; People
ex rel. New York, 0. & W. R. Co. v. Shaw, 143 N. Y. Supp. 177, aff'd. 202
N. Y. 556, 95 N. E. 1137 (1911); Knox v. Southern Paper Co., 143 Miss.
870, 108 So. 288 (1926); Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. State, 111 Neb. 362,
197 N. W. 114 (1923).
3So. Ry. Co. v. Watts, 260 U. S. 519, 43 S. Ct. 192 (1923); Sioux City
Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 260 U. S. 441, 43 S. Ct. 190 (1923); Sunday
Lake Iron Co. v. Wakefield Twp., 247 U. S.350, 38 S.Ct. 495 (1918); Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Greene, 244 U. S.522, 37 S. Ct. 683 (1917); Raymond
v. Chicago Union Traction Co., 207 U. S. 20, 28 S. Ct. 7 (1907).
'See
Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Greene, supra n. 3.
5
Itis to be noted that classification is only for purposes of levy, and not
of assessment.
OW. VA. Rv. CODE (1931) e.
11, art. 3, § 1: "All property shall be assessed
annually as of the first day of January at its true and actual value; that
is to say, at the price for which such property would sell if voluntarily
offered for sale by the owner thereof, upon such terms as such property,
the value of which is sought to be ascertained, is usually sold, and not the
price which might be realized if such property was sold at a forced sale."
7 Greene v. Louisville & Interurban R. Co., 244 U. S. 499, 37 S. Ct. 673
(1916); Taylor v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 88 Fed. 350 (C. C. A. 6th, 1898);
Pons
v. Board of Assessors, 118 La. 1101, 43 So. .891 (1907).
8
U. S. ex rel. Fall City Construction Co. v. Jimmerson, 222 Fed. 489 (C.
C. A. 8th, 1915), cert. denied, 239 U. S.641, 36 S.Ct. 163 (1915). In this
case there was a contract to assess at full value but the remedy does not
depend on that factor.
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How much property must be favored by the discrimination
to entitle the plaintiff to a reduction of his assessment? The West
Virginia court is likely to follow the United States Supreme Court
in requiring that fraud be shown by an intentional systematic
undervaluation of other property.' The apparent reasons for this
high standard of proof are, protection of the courts from the unhappy function of compelling violation of a state statute in order
to give equal protection of law to the plaintiff, and the difficulty
of administering any other rule. Even under this rule the difficulties of proof, except in the unusual case where assessment has
been deliberately made in terms of a percentage of full value,
are well nigh insuperable.
In the principal case the plaintiff simply manufactured
power for sale to distributors, so it was deemed not a public utility
and its property not assessable by the board of public works. The
court apparently overlooked a change in the law written into the
new code which expressly makes such a company a utility subject to regulation.0 Legally it is immaterial what officer or board
makes the assessment,' but as a practical matter it would depend
on the circumstances whether the fact that different properties
were assessed by different agencies complicated the administration of the rule.
Would the "equal protection" clause be violated if the property in one county was assessed at eighty per cent of its value while
property in another county was assessed at one hundred per cent?
No question would arise as to county taxes, since uniformity is only
required within each taxing governmental unit,' and for pur'Michigan R. Tax Cases, 138 Fed. 223 (S. D. Mich. 1905), aff'd. 201 U.
S. 245) 26 S. Ct. 459 (1906).
'0 W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 24, art. 1, § 1. The public service commission is given jurisdiction of any "utility" engaged in the ". . . . generation and transmission of electrical energy by. hydro-electric or other utilities for service to the public, whether directly or through a distributing
utility; . ... ."
The italicized clause is new. Such a provision is constitutional. Southern Okla. Power Co. v. Corp. Com'n., 96 Okla. 53, 220 Pac.

370 (1923).

"The fact that utility properties are assessed by state officers and other
properties by local authorities and there is no common equalizing board for
both makes no difference in principle. L. & N. R. Co. v. Greene, supra n. 3.
2West Penn Power Co. v. Board of Review and Equalization of Brooke
County, supra n. 1, syl. 2: "Under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States it is the right of a taxpayer whose property
is taxed at one hundred per cenfum of its true and actual value to have his
assessment reduced to the percentage of that value at which other property
of the same class, in the same governmental unit of taxation are taxed, even
though the statute requires all property to be assessed at its true and actual
value. I I
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poses of county taxes the county is the governmental unit. In the
case of state taxes the state is the governmental unit, but the
county assessments are used as the basis on which such taxes are
levied. It is submitted that the rule of the principal case logically bars discrimination in assessment for state taxation of property in different counties. Difficulties of proof, however, are so
great as doubtless to explain why no application of the rule to
such a situation has been found on record.
-CHiARtS H. HADEN.

MONOPOLIES -

SHRmAN ACT. -

PRODUCERS'

COAL

SALES

AGENCY

AND

THE

Appalachian Coals Incorporated was organized

as the combined and sole selling agency of seventy-three per cent
of all the active coal producers in what is known as the Appalachian Territory, lying in Virginia, West Virginia, Kentucky and
Tennessee. The purpose of the agency was to eliminate competitive sales and wasteful and undesirable sales practice between its
members. The government sought to enjoin its formation and
operation as being a combination in restraint of interstate commerce and a monopoly in violation of sections one and two of the
Sherman Act.' The District Court granted the injunction.' The
Supreme Court of the United States, after full review of the
evidence, found that substantial competition would exist in the
coal market even if the agency operated; that the organization
would not reasonably restrain trade; and while retaining jurisdiction in the event the agency in operation did restrain interstate trade, reversed the district court. Appalachtian Coals Inc.
v. United States.'
In construing the Sherman Act the courts at first interpreted
restraint of trade as covering any scheme reducing competition
between independent concerns, whether economically justifiable
or not.' In 1911 the Supreme Court judicially legislated into the
act the rule of reason, taken from the common law on restraint of
trade
The principal case demonstrates clearly the elasticity lent
to the statute by judicially placing in it the rule of reason.
'26 Stat. 209, 15 U. S. C. A. §§ 1, 2 (1926).
21 Fed. Supp. 339 (1932).
553 S. Ct. 471 (1933).
' United States v. Freight Association, 166 U. S. 290, 17 S. Ct. 540
United States v. Joint Traffic Association, 171 U. S. 505, 19 S. Ct. 25
8Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. 1, 31 S. Ct. 502
United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U. S. 106, 31 S. Ct. 632

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol39/iss4/9

(1897);
(1898).
(1911);
(1911).
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